I. INTRODUCTION
To the bewilderment of many, the 2008 financial crisis resulted in few criminal prosecutions of the corporate executives whose actions, individually or collectively, caused so much harm to so many investors, employees, taxpayers, and homeowners. 1 face prosecutions, only public outcry and some reputational effects.
14 The leaders of those financial firms that survived after receiving TARP funds, though their shareholders suffered tremendous losses, have retained their positions and their wealth.1 5 Though the 2001 scandals involved intentional behavior that violated state and federal laws, particularly the federal securities laws, prosecutors have made few colorable allegations of intentional violations of existing statutory law against various actors involved in the 200816 financial crisis. 17 The behavior at the heart of the financial crisis involved no obviously intentional violations of criminal laws or other regulations, but did involve risky trading practices surrounding mortgage-related derivatives. 18 Wells Fargo in a controversial acquisition brokered by the U.S. Government, which shut out potential acquirer Citigroup in October 2008. CEO G. Kennedy Thompson had been forced to resign in June 2008, but continues to participate in the finance industry in the private equity world and by serving on various corporate boards.
14. See Morgenson & Story, supra note 1 (stating that no collective government has emerged since the crisis to criminally prosecute top figures in the financial crisis). 16. The cases involving backdating of stock options for executives preceded the 2008 financial crisis and are not discussed here; though, arguably, the prosecutions were not as pervasive as the practice of backdating. See Peter Lattman, Backdating Scandal Ends with a Whimper, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 11, 2013, 9:38 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/l 1/1 l/backdating-scandal-ends-with-a-whimper/ (stating that the courts did not see stock option backdating as a major financial problem).
17. Another theory as to the dearth of prosecutions since 2008 is that bringing a criminal case against an energy or telecom company that is bankrupt has fewer collateral consequences than bringing the same case against a systemically significant financial institution interconnected in the U.S. economy. See Mark Gongloff, Eric Holder Admits Some Banks Are Just Too Big To Prosecute, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 6, 2013, 3:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/06/eric-holder-banks-too-bign_2821741.html (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Attorney General Holder as saying in testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee that "I am concerned that the size of some of these institutions becomes so large that it does become difficult for us to prosecute them when we are hit with indications that if you do prosecute, if you do bring a criminal charge, it will have a negative impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy."); Mark Gongloff, Eric Holder: Actually I Meant to Say No Banks Are Too Big to Jail, HUFFINGTON POST (May 14, 2013, 3:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/15/eric-holder-too-big-to-jail_n_3280694.html (noting that although Attorney General Holder claimed others had misconstrued his prior statement, no bank had been criminally charged regarding the financial crisis).
18. For example, here is a description of the root cause of Lehman Brothers' demise from the report of the court-appointed examiner in its bankruptcy case:
In 2006, Lehman made the deliberate decision to embark upon an aggressive growth strategy, to
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Criminal law, however, rarely applies to actions that result from poor judgment, leaving risky, or negligent, acts that cause harm to the civil torts system. 19 Arguably, the overwhelming majority of actions that combined to impair the U.S. economy were not criminal. In most cases, the independent and unrelated actors who caused the financial crisis did not intend to cause harm; they made poor decisions or took "excessive" risks. 20 What has understandably angered the investing community, workers, and homeowners in the wake of the financial crisis has been the otherwise-legal risk taking climates at financial firms that encouraged traders and other employees to use firm assets to take risky investment positions-originating, holding, or purchasing residential mortgagebacked securities (RMBS); selling credit default swaps (CDS) related to RMBS; purchasing or selling collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) related to RMBS; or some combination thereof. Continuing to invest, even heavily, in these types of securities in the face of negative financial forecasts was not illegal, 2 1 nor was being highly leveraged.
Unfortunately, state and federal laws are not good at criminalizing foolishness, even foolishness involving other people's money. Historically, civil liability for extremely poor judgment, whether negligent or grossly negligent, has filled gaps that criminal law leaves behind. Actions without evil intent should arguably not be punished by the criminal law, but many of these same actions should give rise to civil liability to compensate the injured and deter future bad conduct. Without any type of criminal retribution for wrongdoers, shareholders of the foolhardy financial firms could theoretically bring civil lawsuits against the officers and directors of their firms for poor decision making. These corporate actors made bad decisions that not only affected the economy as a whole, but also lost substantial sums of money belonging to the corporation and thus its shareholders, to whom those actors owe fiduciary duties. Therefore, one could argue that, in the months leading up to the financial crisis, many boards of directors breached their duties to those shareholders to manage take on significantly greater risk, and to substantially increase leverage on its capital. In 2007, as the sub-prime residential mortgage business progressed from problem to crisis, Lehman was slow to recognize the developing storm and its spillover effect upon commercial real estate and other business lines. Rather than pull back, Lehman made the conscious decision to "double down," hoping to profit from a counter-cyclical strategy. As it did so, Lehman significantly and repeatedly exceeded its own internal risk limits and controls. their firms responsibly. This argument stems from, and is bolstered by, the astounding losses of many firms, particularly financial firms. Specifically the numerous actions of firm employees taking on "excessive" risk at the outset proved devastatingly unwise, even stupid. 22 The concept of a new duty to manage risk provides a glimmer of hope that those at fault--corporate boards and officers-may be forced to compensate the firms for the "house money" that they lost at the Wall Street casino. Going forward, the argument continues, the existence of such a duty may have a deterrent effect on future boards, which may demand stricter internal systems for monitoring firm risk.
However, the existing corporate law scheme for challenging poor judgment does not leave much room for a cause of action based on mismanaging risk, even financial risk within financial firms. This corporate law reality is not a quirk of history, but the product of design; corporate law specifically anticipates and rejects claims based on poor judgment. 23 Though personal injury law embraces the theory of liability for simple negligence, corporate law in most states emphatically does not, preferring to rely on the market for capital and the market for labor to discipline poor or even mediocre management.
2 4 In other words, shareholders can sell shares of companies that are poorly managed, and companies can fire poorly performing managers; imposing liability through a shareholder suit is the least efficient way to discipline management. State law derivative actions do allow for directors and officers to be liable for grossly negligent decisions, conflicts of interest, and actions taken in bad faith. 25 Because of various 1983) ) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("While it is often stated that corporate directors and officers will be liable for negligence in carrying out their corporate duties, all seem agreed that such a statement is misleading.... Whatever the terminology, the fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment."); Fred S. McChesney 24. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 104 (stating that "market forces encourage directors to make such decisions carefully"). Theoretically, shareholders have the ability to replace directors by exercising their statutory right to vote in director elections. However, in publicly held corporations, the ability of any individual shareholder to oust a director is illusory. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REv. 833 (2005) (finding that for firms with a market capitalization of more than $200 million, shareholder challenges to management-chosen director nominees occurred on average at two companies per year in the United States).
25. These duties historically were seen as the duty of care, loyalty, and good faith. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Del. 1995) ("This court held that to rebut the presumption [of the business judgment rule], a shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence that the board of directors, in reaching its challenged decision, breached any one of its triad of fiduciary duties: good faith, loyalty or due care."). However, in recent years the Delaware Supreme Court has interpreted this "triad" as merely two duties: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, which encompass both conflicts of interest and bad faith derelictions of the board's supervisory duties. See Stone These impediments within corporate fiduciary duty law notwithstanding, several lawsuits have attempted to prevail on fiduciary duty claims, with predictably little success. Not to be stymied, some scholars have argued for courts to recognize this new duty (or a new component of an existing duty). 28 To do so, courts are urged to analyze board decisions either under a framework of how reasonable managers make decisions that impact overall firm risk (duty of care) or a framework of how reasonable managers monitor internal systems designed to manage firm risk (duty of loyalty). 29 In addition, in these and similar lawsuits, litigants have alleged breaches of the fiduciary duties relating to board decisions approving incentive compensation plans that encouraged excessive risk taking or approving large compensation packages for those who engaged in excessive risk taking. 30 Relatedly, some litigants have made other attempts to create a cause of action under federal securities law for failing to disclose excessive risk taking.
3 1 This Article argues that not only does a duty to manage financial risk not exist within the prevailing corporate law framework of fiduciary duties, but also that recognizing a separate duty to manage financial risk 32 32. In this Article, the term "financial risk" is primarily used to refer to investment risk of firms that purchase and sell financial products for their own accounts, but it is also used to describe liquidity risk, prepayment risk and credit risk. See Orenstein, supra note 22, at 778 (distinguishing these types of financial risks from "operational risk," which involves typical Caremark risks of wrongdoing and illegal actions within a of this duty would be identifiable only in hindsight, and such a duty would require courts to resolve questions best left to individual firms and their shareholders. For example, courts would have to determine what amount of risk taking is excessive for a given firm at the point of time the decision was made, and whether lack of risk taking would still be actionable as a failure to manage risk. Theoretically, the duty to manage financial risk would also encompass failures to take risks, making risk-averse firms also susceptible to breach of duty claims. Furthermore, a duty to manage risk would seem to encompass not only financial risks, but also other sorts of risks, such as business risk, litigation risk, political risk, environmental risk, tort risk, and disaster risk.
This Article does not seek to rehash the arguments about the causes of the 2008 financial crisis. Though many may disagree over which factors were primary or contributing, most commentators agree that the economy was harmed by "excessive borrowing, risky investments and lack of transparency" at systemically important financial institutions, "collapsing mortgage lending standards," the holding of over-thecounter derivatives by financial institutions, and conflicts of credit rating agencies. 34 This Article reviews the litigation that emanated from the financial crisis in which shareholders of financial institutions attempted to gain legal redress from those actions that not only were contributing factors of the financial crisis, but also caused shareholder wealth to vanish. Part II analyzes attempts to hold financial firms liable under federal securities fraud for misstating the amount and character of the risks to which they exposed corporate assets. Part III transitions away from federal remedies to state law fiduciary duty derivative actions, including actions in which shareholders allege a breach of the duty of care and waste. This Part analyzes the current state of the law of the duty of care under the business judgment rule given the existence of permissive exculpation clause statutes. Part IV continues the discussion of fiduciary duties, but focuses on the duty of loyalty, and in particular, the duty of oversight. This Part explores all of the case law based on allegations that financial firms breached their duty of oversight by failing to monitor firm risk. Finally, in Part V, this Article considers whether a new duty to monitor risk, either as an extension of the duty of oversight or as a new duty, would fulfill goals of holding boards accountable while also maximizing shareholder value. The Conclusion in Part VI summarizes why imposing a broader duty of oversight to manage financial risk would inevitably become unmanageable.
II. BAD CORPORATE BEHAVIOR AS SECURITIES FRAUD
Corporate directors and officers may feel the effects of their bad behavior in a number of ways. The first and most immediate, of course, is in the market for capital. Among publicly held corporations, capital flows fairly easily based on the public's knowledge of management competencies. When firms announce new products, changes firm). The term "financial risk" is not intended here to encompass business risks.
33. This Article does not address concerns with the mechanism by which these claims are brought-the shareholder derivative lawsuit. Other commentators have written about the challenges for shareholders as well as the agency problems endemic in derivative lawsuits. This Article is mainly concerned with the legal doctrine of the substantive claims, not the procedural efficiency of the manner in which they are brought.
34. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at xxiii-xxv (listings the FCIC's conclusions as to the causes of the financial crisis).
in leadership, or financial data, shares of that firm will be bought or sold based on the perception of whether those choices are wise or those facts reflect the work of skillful managers. Unsatisfied shareholders will take their investment capital elsewhere or, if their stakes are sufficiently large, demand new management. 35 However, if the behavior of directors and officers is more than misdirected and actually violates laws, then state or federal prosecutors have the authority to charge firms criminally or civilly.
A. Federal Enforcement: Nondisclosure ofExcessive Risk as Securities Fraud
For firms subject to federal securities laws, both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have the ability to prosecute firms for violations of certain provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.36 Though neither act seeks to regulate corporate decision making or create an obligation for directors or officers to act prudently or reasonably, 3 7 both acts create various disclosure duties to ensure accurate reporting of financial facts and internal affairs to the investing public.
38 Therefore, if a firm is underperforming but continues to paint a rosy picture for investors, this misrepresentation is actionable by federal authorities, both civilly 3 9 and criminally. 40 In addition, several important antifraud provisions of the securities acts are actionable by investors through private litigation, 4 1 resulting in numerous class action securities fraud lawsuits filed by shareholders each
35.
See, e.g., Stephanie Clifford, JC Penney Ousts Chief of 17 Months, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2013, at BI (reporting that CEO Ron Johnson was asked to step down after causing the department store chain to lose hundreds of millions of dollars each quarter due to an unpopular, "no sales, no coupons" campaign).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (2012).
37.
The first draft of the Securities Act, written by Huston Thompson, would have created a mechanism whereby the federal government would approve the merits of proposed offerings by issuers; this concept was 53 However, shortly after the financial industry's meltdown in Fall 2008, the federal government did investigate incomplete disclosures of firm-specific risk 54 by a few notable firms. However, the SEC brought these cases as civil enforcement actions, not as criminal actions. For example, the SEC charged Countrywide officers Angelo Mozilo (CEO), David Sambol (COO), and Eric Sieracki (CFO) with securities fraud for failure to disclose to investors the liberalization of the firm's underwriting policies in the years leading up to its demise. 55 In addition, the SEC included charges of insider trading against Angelo Mozilo for establishing a Rule lOb-5(1) sales plan for his shares while possessing negative nonpublic information about the company. 56 Mozilo settled these charges for $22.5 million in fines and $45 million in disgorgement. 57 Sambol's settlement amounted to $5.5 million, and Sieracki's to $130,000.58 Though Mozilo's large payout was touted as a success for the SEC and as proof of a high probability that the SEC would have been successful at trial, the DOJ did not move forward with a criminal investigation into the same alleged activities. 59 One of the other few successful 61. See id. ("Citigroup had more than $40 billion of additional subprime exposure in these categories, which it didn't disclose until November 2007 after a decline in their value.").
62. Citigroup was and is a defendant in a wide array of cases stemming from its role in the financial crisis, which included disclosures it made in packaging residential-mortgage-backed securities and selling collateralized debt obligations. Citigroup settled criminal charges with the DOJ regarding its certification of investments, then the securities laws have done their job; investors can decide whether to invest based on full knowledge of the risks entailed. However, if firms misstate their levels of exposure to risky investments, current and prospective investors may buy or hold shares without adequate information, and that misstatement may cause any losses that ensue. As a threshold matter, the shareholders must be able to pinpoint specific statements that are false or misleading or require further explanation. 65 Even then, shareholders face certain challenges to these claims, namely that the risks that were omitted or downplayed must not be publicly known risks 66 and must be material.
67
Finally, the statements must not be too general to be verified opinion 68 or mere puffery.
69
The most successful securities fraud lawsuit relating to the financial crisis, but also one of the very few, was brought in the Central District of California against certain individual officers and directors of Countrywide Financial. 70 In the California case, shareholders alleged that Countrywide's disclosure documents, filed with the SEC before 2007, contained fraudulent statements about the company's underwriting practices and portfolio of mortgage products.
7 1 To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs had to overcome certain pleading obstacles, including meeting the burden of proof on such elements as falsity, materiality, scienter, and loss causation. 72 In other words, statements
65. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977) (refusing to find a viable Rule lOb-5 cause of action in a merger transaction challenged as "unfair" when no disclosure was challenged as false, stating that Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act "did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement").
66. See Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that inaccurate statements about the length of delays regarding proposed nuclear reactors were not actionable, stating, "[j]ust as a firm needn't disclose that 50% of all new products vanish from the market within a short time, so Commonwealth Edison needn't disclose the hazards of its [nuclear reactor] business, hazards apparent to all serious observers and most casual ones").
67. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (stating that a fact is material if there is "a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available").
68. However, if the opinion necessarily implies facts that the speaker knows are untrue, then that statement of belief can be actionable. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1087 (1991) (upholding action against board of directors that misstated reasons for merger).
69. See Longman v. Food Lion, Inc., 197 F.3d 675, 684-85 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that Food Lion's statements that it had "some of the best benefits in the supermarket industry" and "clean and conveniently located stores" were not material misstatements even though an expos6 showed two stores engaging in unsanitary practices and illegal labor practices). 71. See id at 1153 (giving examples of false statements alleged in the consolidated complaint). 72. Notably, Section 11 claims have fewer elements that plaintiffs must plead and prove than Rule 1Ob-5 fraud claims; most notably, Section 11 plaintiffs do not have to prove scienter and loss causation. See id. at 1162 (internal citations omitted) ("Defendants are liable for innocent or negligent material misstatements or omissions, subject to a few affirmative defenses."); id. at 1170 ("Loss causation is not a § 11 element. Rather, § 11(e) makes the absence of loss causation (or "negative causation") an affirmative defense to reduce or avoid liability."). The Rule lOb-5 fraud claims not only have additional elements, but plaintiffs also face heightened pleading standards under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). See id at 1184 ("A plaintiff must prove the following elements in connection with the purchase or sale: (1) a material [('materiality')] (2) misrepresentation or omission [('falsity')] (3) made with scienter [('scienter')] (4) on which plaintiff relied about defendants' exposure to subprime risk would have to be specific enough to be falsifiable and not mere marketing statements; the speaker, whether an officer or the corporation, would have to know the statement was false or be reckless as to its falsity, and the false statements, rather than the declining stock market, would have to have caused the plaintiff to lose money. Though these burdens can be sufficiently onerous to end most private securities litigation, 73 plaintiffs prevailed against the defendants' 2008 motion to dismiss. The court refused to dismiss important parts of the complaint against directors and officers, even though many of the allegedly false statements were as generic as claims that their mortgages were "high quality" and that their underwriting standards were "consistent" and designed to reveal fraud. 74 Normally, such types of phrases are considered immaterial for purposes of securities fraud because investors recognize them as "puffery."
7 5 However, the court distinguished the Countrywide claims because the statements regarded "essential operations" of an issuer that is solely a mortgage originator, 76 even though the statements "would not be actionable in the vast majority of cases . . . ."77 Therefore, though some claims were dismissed on both procedural and substantive grounds against some defendants, 78 many important claims were allowed to stand against the company, former CEO Angelo Mozilo, 79 and other former officers. 74. See In re Countrywide, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 1153-54 (alteration in original) (giving as examples disclosures that stated "proprietary underwriting systems . . . improve the consistency of underwriting standards, assess collateral adequacy and help to prevent fraud" and referring to "quality control proves" and "underwriting standards" in the context of a company that had all but abandoned any underwriting standards previously articulated). Another area of misleading statements cited were references to Countrywide's portfolio as "prime" and "nonprime," which did not conform to industry definitions, and which were not defined in disclosure materials until 2007, giving the impression that Countrywide had a very small exposure to the subprime market when nearly all of its mortgages were subprime. See id. at 1154 (quoting a Countrywide rep as stating that "over 90% of Countrywide loan origination volume is prime quality").
75. See id at 1144 (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479) (acknowledging that "[t]he federal securities laws do not create liability for poor business judgment or failed operations").
See id (noting that "
[c]ore mortgage-related operations accounted for the vast majority of Countrywide's earnings during the class period-93% of fiscal year ("FY") 2006 pretax earnings").
77. See id. (explaining that "Countrywide's practices so departed from its public statements that even 'high-quality' became materially false or misleading").
78. See In re Countrywide, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 1205 (stating that all claims under Rule lOb-5 against the auditor, KPMG, were dismissed without prejudice, and all Section 11 claims except for one were also dismissed).
79. See id. at 1192-94 (comparing Mozilo's public statements about Countrywide's "very, very good solid subprime business" with contemporaneous internal statements). Unfortunately for potential shareholder plaintiffs, the 2008 private securities fraud case against Countrywide has rarely been followed. 8 1 Particularly in the Southern District of New York, which has the highest caseload of federal securities fraud cases among the federal district courts, the Countrywide decision has not ushered in a new era of successful securities fraud cases against financial institutions that touted the soundness of their portfolios. 82 In fact, the Southern District of New York dismissed complaints against Wachovia under the traditional theory that claiming to have "conservative" or "sound" underwriting standards was mere puffery 8 3 and also that the plaintiffs failed to allege scienter as to the falsity of these general statements. 84 Because investors understand puffery to be mere marketing language or gloss, such statements are not at B5 (reporting that the settlement was the largest payout to come out of the subprime crisis to date). This shareholder settlement occurred shortly before the settlement in the SEC enforcement action. 
2009) ("If
WaMu's lending environment was fraught with such extreme departure from any plausible conception of "standards," a statement that the Company followed underwriting standards to manage or mitigate credit risk would mislead a reasonable investor.") However, the Washington Mutual court did not answer the second question of whether the plaintiffs had adequately alleged scienter as to statements about underwriting standards, denying the motion to dismiss as to Section 11 claims, but granting plaintiffs leave to submit a more definite statement about scienter as to Rule 1 Ob-5 claims. In re Washington Mutual, 259 F.R.D. at 503, 509.
82. See, e.g., In re Sec. Capital Assurance, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 729 F. Supp. 2d 569, 580, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing complaint in its entirety because it failed to adequately allege scienter and materiality regarding statements that underwriting was "disciplined" and "conservative"). The court seemed fairly unsympathetic to plaintiffs. See id. at 597 (reiterating that securities fraud actions cannot be premised on "allegations of mismanagement" or "optimistic statements or puffery"). See id. Even as to the few statements it agreed were material and falsifiable, the court dismissed on the basis of loss causation, reflecting the harsh reality that securities fraud plaintiffs have numerous obstacles to overcome on the way to trial. 84. See id at 344 ("Assuming arguendo that these statements are actionable, Plaintiffs still fail to raise an inference that Defendants knew or should have known the contrary facts at the time of the challenged statements."). The court explained that such an inference arises when the company affirmatively decides to lower underwriting standards while still publicly touting them at their prior strength. Id. This case was settled for $75 million while being appealed to the Second Circuit. In re Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 6172(RTS), 2012 WL 2774969, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2012). In approving the settlement, the court remarked, "Given the history of this case, including the fact that the court previously dismissed the Second Amended Complaint in its entirety, the Court has little difficulty concluding that Plaintiffs would face substantial hurdles in establishing liability and damages in this action." Id. at *5. actionable as fraudulent misstatements. 85 In a similar case brought in the Southern District against Citigroup, the court dismissed claims based on statements made by the issuer about its mortgage portfolio based on lack of scienter-there was insufficient proof that high-ranking officials knew anything about individual mortgages or groups of mortgages. 86 In addition, statements that Citigroup was "well-positioned" and a "pillar of strength" were neither material nor actionable; these were merely "expressions of 'puffery and corporate optimism."' 8 7 The Countrywide decision may be seen as a product of its time and geography. When the housing bubble burst, the State of California was one of the hardest hit areas in the United States. Given the fact that Countrywide was so involved in the mortgage industry in California, the courts there, even federal courts, would naturally be interested in ensuring that the firm did not escape public retribution for its acts, which had such ruinous consequences. However, even in the Central District of California, the court has distinguished its own Countrywide case, characterizing the firm as one who touted underwriting practices when it had abandoned them entirely so as not to have any, not as a firm that misled investors as to the quality of those existing practices. 88 The lasting impact of Countrywide may be limited to cases involving issuers that have one line of business and make statements-even generalized statements, regarding that business model that are fundamentally untrue where this disconnect is common knowledge within the company. This interpretation of Countrywide was followed in a Southern District of New York case involving an issuer making absolute statements, such as "we have zero in subprime," and stating false loan-to-value (LTV) data. 
III. EXCESSIVE RISK AS A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DuTy
The crux of the financial crisis securities fraud cases was that management was making very risky 90 decisions with corporate assets: maintaining high levels of leverage; originating loans that deviated from accepted underwriting criteria; establishing bonus plans for mortgage brokers predicated on originating loans; purchasing RMBS and CDOs for the firm's portfolio; entering into CDS based on RMBS or CDOs; and creating incentive compensation plans that led employees and high-ranking officers to take even riskier positions, even as signs in the marketplace looked like red flags. The securities fraud cases tried, mostly unsuccessfully, to shoehorn complaints of this poor assessment of risk into complaints of fraudulent misstatements of current levels of firm risk. However, complaints by shareholders as to management decisions, if not the articulation to the public of the state of those decisions, are generally the province of state corporate governance law, not federal securities law.
9 1 As the shareholders in the securities fraud lawsuits were told, "[a]llegations of mismanagement, even where a plaintiff claims that it would not have invested in an entity had it known of the management issues, are insufficient to support a securities fraud claim .... 92 If allegations of mismanagement, particularly gross mismanagement with dire consequences, do not rise to the level of a criminal indictment or even civil sanctions under securities fraud statutes, then shareholders must turn to state fiduciary duty law for redress. 93 Under state corporate law, directors and officers are agents of the corporation who owe the firm fiduciary duties. The majority of claims against corporate actors fall under the categories of the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. 94 However, though they are oftarticulated, they are seldom violated as a matter of law. 95 This practical result is not a 90. Both these lawsuits and this Article use the terms "risk" and "risky" fairly loosely. Some of these "risky" decisions were decisions with a known statistical risk, while others were decisions with uncertain statistical risk. See Lynn A. Stout, Uncertainty, Dangerous Optimism, and Speculation: An Inquiry into Some Limits of Democratic Governance, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 1177, 1179-80 (2011-12) (explaining the difference between "risk" and "uncertainty"). Likewise, some decisions with an accepted statistical risk may have been premised upon statistical models that were flawed or outdated. For purposes of this Article, these decisions will generally be treated similarly. result of happenstance; courts, particularly the Delaware courts, have emphasized that directors should be subject to suit over their decisions only rarely, and liability for directors should be imposed even less often.
96

A. The Duty of Care
To the uninitiated, the actions at the heart of the financial crisis seem like textbook cases of breaches of the duty of care, as articulated in both the common law of agency 97 and foundational corporate law cases. 98 The agents of financial firms, lower-level employees, officers, and perhaps directors, made decisions that arguably were not made with particular "care, competence and diligence," at least given the disastrous results. 99 However, the legal avenue with the least probability of success for imposing liability on directors and officers at such firms is a lawsuit alleging a breach of the duty of care. 100
Background
The types of decisions regarding the purchase and sale of risky securities and derivative contracts are acts with a significant risk of loss. In other areas of the law, these acts would be characterized as negligent, or as creating an unreasonable risk of loss or harm.
10 1 On its face, the duty of care would seem to encompass negligent decisions and also, therefore, negligent decisions regarding firm risk. However, nothing could be further from the judicial reality of duty of care claims.
As anyone who has taken a basic business entities course knows, this duty is subject to something called the business judgment rule. 102 The business judgment rule is not 99. See FCIC Report, supra note 9, at 7-8 (describing a line of bad decisions beginning with loan officers that fueled the mortgage crisis as one actor pushed the risk of a poor decision to the next in line).
100. In cases brought alleging that directors breached a duty to manage risk, the complaints do not pigeonhole this duty into the duty of care or loyalty, at least not in those words. It is then up to the court to decipher whether the language of the complaint states a claim under the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, or both. Generally, if a claim points to a specific director decision or numerous decisions, then that decision will be examined under the duty of care unless it a conflicted transaction under the duty of loyalty. If the claim points to activities of the firm that were not subject to a director decision, then the court will interpret this as an oversight claim under the duty of loyalty.
101. See Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation ofDuty ofCare and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1157 (2013) (noting that though "[t]he duty of care is dressed in the language of torts, ... directors are not held to a negligence standard for business losses").
102. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 87 (2004) ("The business judgment rule commonly is understood today as a standard of liability by which courts review the decisions of the board of directors.... I argue that the rule is better understood as a doctrine of abstention pursuant to which courts in fact refrain from reviewing board decisions unless exacting exactly a rule or a defense, but it works like a presumption in any lawsuit alleging a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with any decision of the board. 103 The business judgment rule presumes that the board acted in good faith, in the best interests of the corporation, and after informing itself and engaging in deliberation. 104 To overcome this presumption, a successful plaintiff would have to prove bad faith, a conflict of interest, or gross negligence.1 05 Needless to say, the business judgment rule screens out most claims of breach of the duty of care because plaintiffs cannot meet this burden.
Not only are due care claims met with a presumption that defendants exercised due care, but state law also allows for articles of incorporation to "exculpate" directors from liability for breaches of the duty of due care,1 06 making this cause of action essentially a dead letter. 107 Even if shareholders could prove that firms' decisions with regard to risk were grossly negligent, the directors may still be insulated from liability by charter. Given the procedural hurdles of the shareholder derivative lawsuit, the presence of an exculpation clause may result not only in directors ultimately facing no liability for a judgment, but also in the case ending on a motion to dismiss.
108 Of course, maintaining the rhetoric of a duty of care while simultaneously undercutting its strength with the preconditions for review are satisfied."). Whether the business judgment rule is a deferential standard of review of director decisions, a presumption that director decisions are made with due care, in good faith, and in the interest of the corporation, or a rule of abstention, the end result is that most directors' decisions are insulated 108. Briefly, shareholders in a derivative action are required to make a demand on the board of directors that they sue themselves on behalf of the corporation before proceeding with the lawsuit. See, e.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. However, shareholders can show demand futility by showing that the directors are not independent and disinterested or that the action was not "the product of a valid exercise of business judgment." See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. One way to show interestedness is to show that the majority of the directors would be subject to personal liability should the lawsuit be successful. Therefore, even a well-pled claim of gross negligence would not subject a majority of the directors to personal liability in the presence of an exculpation clause, making it impossible for a derivative plaintiff to plead demand futility on the grounds that the directors are conflicted. business judgment rule seems both convoluted and illogical.
10 9 The traditional argument for limiting the enforcement of this duty with the business judgment rule, and against claims that corporate boards were negligent, is that shareholders would prefer boards to be risk-seeking instead of risk-averse. 110 Particularly in the passive-investor context, shareholders are hypothesized to be perfectly diversified. Therefore, diversified shareholders with many different investments that presumably hedge against systemic risk both assume and hope that boards will not be overly conservative with corporate assets.111 A few mistakes along the way are preferable to flat growth and few profits over the long term. As Chancellor William Allen explained in Gagliardi v. Trifoods International, Inc.:
Corporate directors of public companies typically have a very small proportionate ownership interest in their corporations and little or no incentive compensation. Thus, they enjoy (as residual owners) only a very small proportion of any "upside" gains earned by the corporation on risky investment projects. If, however, corporate directors were to be found liable for a corporate loss from a risky project on the ground that the investment was too risky (foolishly risky! stupidly risky! egregiously risky!-you supply the adverb), their liability would be joint and several for the whole loss (with I suppose a right of contribution). Given the scale of operation of modern public corporations, this stupefying disjunction between risk and reward for corporate directors threatens undesirable effects. Given this disjunction, only a very small probability of director liability based on "negligence", "inattention", "waste", etc., could induce a board to avoid authorizing risky investment projects to any extent! Obviously, it is in the shareholders' economic interest to offer sufficient protection to directors from liability for negligence, etc., to allow directors to conclude that, as a practical matter, there is no risk that, if they act in good faith and meet minimal proceduralist standards of attention, they can face liability as a result of a business loss.
1 12
A second argument for the business judgment rule is that courts are in a very poor position to second-guess the business decisions that boards make, 1 13 particularly in
109.
The existence of the business judgment rule has been described as reflecting the tension between honoring the "authority" of the directors while ensuring "accountability." See Griffith, supra note 105, at 12 (describing corporate law's goal of balance); Bainbridge, supra note 102, at 103 (discussing directors' dual roles). The balance in that equation definitely seems to tip toward "authority."
110. See Rhee, supra note 101, at 1156 (restating the argument that the purpose of tort negligence is to spread losses, but the purpose of the corporate duty of care is to incentivize risk taking). S11. See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (reasoning that because shareholders can diversify their investments, "it is in [shareholders'] economic interest for the corporation to accept in rank order all positive net present value investment projects available to the corporation, starting with the highest risk adjusted rate of return first").
Id.
113. In the area of tort law, juries second-guess alleged negligent actors all the time, whether the actors are acting as tugboat operators, bargees, landlords, road construction workers, drivers, pharmaceutical companies, or crane operators. Defendants and plaintiffs are free to offer expert testimony as to how reasonable actors in particular fields operate, and jurors are generally free to hold defendants to higher or lower standards than custom recommends. The main exception to this practice is in the area of medical malpractice, where expert testimony as to the standard of care of a reasonable physician is generally held to be binding on the jury.
hindsight.1
14 Relatedly, if all business decisions that turned out to be bad were actionable in court, corporations might spend corporate time and resources defending lawsuits, depleting shareholder profits. If management continually makes poor decisions, shareholders can sell their shares far more easily than they can file a lawsuit.
The countervailing argument is that insulation from mistakes may go too far. 115 The prospect of accountability can have the healthy effect of deterring almost-egregious mistakes and incentivizing thoughtful decision-making processes. However, the past 30 years of duty of care litigation, at least in Delaware, reflects legislators' and courts' willingness to say that shareholders accept the possibility of director mistakes except in the most glaring instances.
Successful (Delaware) Duty of Care Cases
When asked to cite a successful duty of care case in Delaware, corporate lawyers would almost certainly name Smith v. Van Gorkom. 116 Though the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately held that the board of directors was grossly negligent in approving an acquisition of Trans Union Corporation by a group led by Jay Pritzker, the success of the case may be in how precisely it communicated to other boards how to avoid the same fate.
117 Though the court held that the board violated its duty of care by not reaching an "informed business judgment," it did not weigh in on the correctness of the board's decision, solidifying the notion that the duty of care is a process duty. 118 Courts will look not to the substance of decisions, but to whether boards were rational in their decisionmaking processes. In other words, had the board spent time and resources acquiring quality information, then the board would not have been liable for the same decision, however poor the result. 114. If a decision turns out to be profitable, presumably no lawsuit would follow.. Therefore, only unprofitable decisions will ever be brought before a court under the claim of a breach of the duty of due care. 607 (2002) (arguing that the Trans Union board was unfairly punished for the sloppy actions of the CEO and that even though "the decision may have dramatically improved the quality of deliberations in corporate boardrooms, the imposition of liability on the defendants in the case seems profoundly unjust").
See Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on
118. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893 (holding that the directors breached their fiduciary duties because they failed to go through the process of "inform[ing] themselves of all information reasonably available"). The Van Gorkom facts include the following: Chairman and CEO Van Gorkom had a few casual conversations with senior management regarding the possibility of a leveraged buyout before meeting with Pritzker and suggesting such a leveraged buyout at $55 per share, which Pritzker immediately accepted. Id. at 865-67. Van Gorkom then presented the agreement to the board during a one-hour meeting, at which no director reviewed the actual agreement but agreed to terms favorable to Pritzker. Id. at 866-70. Efforts at subsequent meetings to lessen these favorable terms had little effect, and the board made no additional effort to directly receive any independent valuations or advice. Id. 119. Had the board's decision gone against the weight of the information it assessed, there would be an argument that the board either did not act in good faith-losing the benefit of the business judgment rule-or Though the Van Gorkom decision understandably created agitation among corporate boards, 120 the case did not bring forth a noticeable change in the number of cases in Delaware imposing liability on boards for breaches of the duty of care. 121 In the years that followed, boards ensured that they spent adequate time deliberating important decisions, consulted with several expensive valuation, legal, and accounting specialists, and documented these efforts. 122 Consequently, the Delaware courts have rewarded these practices by upholding board decisions that were arrived at with due care. 123 In fact, the Delaware Supreme Court has been loath to hold that a board, even a board that acts similarly to a Van Gorkom board, has violated its duty of care. 
Section 102(b) (7)
Though the panic caused by Van Gorkom would prove unwarranted, the Delaware legislature responded to the case with Section 102(b)(7), which allows corporations, in their articles of incorporation, to "carve out" certain breaches of fiduciary duty for which directors will not be personally liable. 125 This provision does not, however, allow articles to limit liability "[fjor any breach of the director's duty of loyalty,"
1 26 "[fjor acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law," 12 7 or "[fjor any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit." 1 2 8 The glaring and obvious breach that is left over, and thus that the board's deliberative process was grossly negligent in ignoring the information. Gorkom's greatest vice is that it conveys the inaccurate impression that claims for money damages against corporate managers for failure of attention constitute a common and viable form of litigation.. . . Van Gorkom represents the reality of litigation regarding a breach of the duty of care only slightly better than a unicorn represents the animal kingdom.").
See Lloyd L. Drury, III, What's the Cost of a Free Pass? A Call for the Re-Assessment of Statutes that Allow for the Elimination of Personal Liability for Directors
124. See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 56 (2006) (establishing that director behavior may be far short of best practices, but not subject the board to liability, and reasoning, "[r]egrettably, the committee's informational and decision making process used here was not so tidy. That is one reason why the chancellor found that although the committee's process did not fall below the level required for a proper exercise of due care, it did fall short of what best practices would have counseled"); Butler, supra note 121, at 280 (arguing that by upholding the Disney directors' actions regarding CEO Michael Ovitz's pay package, the Delaware Supreme Court effectively reversed Smith v. Van Gorkom).
125. See Butler, supra note 121, at 274 ("Delaware had to adapt to the Delaware Supreme Court's mistake or potentially lose market dominance.").
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(i) (2011).
Id. § 102(b)(7)(ii).
128. Id. § 102(b)(7)(iv). The Model Business Corporation Act has a similar provision, which allows for articles of incorporation to eliminate or limit director liability except in the case of "a financial benefit received by a director to which he is not entitled, an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or the The Duty to Manage Risk fair game for limiting director liability, is the duty of care. Therefore, with so many corporations adopting these provisions, few parties bring duty of care claims because very few claims succeed, and even those that do lack economic value. 129 Because of these obstacles, shareholders of financial firms necessarily became creative in their claims against these firms for breaches of fiduciary duty following the 2008 financial crisis. For breaches of the duty of care, the shareholders had to point to specific decisions made by the boards of directors. Shareholder plaintiffs were required to show that these decisions were not only grossly negligent (to overcome the business judgment rule), but also in bad faith (to overcome any applicable exculpation clause).
B. Excessive Risk and the Duty of Care
For the reasons stated above, few cases arising out of the financial crisis articulated the mistakes of boards of directors as breaches of the duty of care. 130 In In re Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 13 1 shareholders challenged the decision of the board of directors to approve a compensation scheme that was in place leading up to the financial crisis as both grossly negligent and waste. 132 The Delaware Chancery Court noted that because Goldman's charter contained an exculpation clause, to prevail on a motion to dismiss for demand futility, plaintiffs were required to "plead particularized facts that demonstrate . . . 'intentional dereliction of duty' or 'a conscious disregard' for their responsibilities, amounting to bad faith."
1 33 This court emphasized that these failures of good faith are "qualitatively different from, and more culpable than" gross negligence; i.e., different from grossly gross negligence. The court found that no facts gave rise to an inference that the board was either not adequately informed or was not acting in good (2010) . Neither statute allows for limiting liability for approving unlawful dividends. See Hamermesh, supra note 123, at 490 (offering data that shows that virtually all corporations that are incorporated in jurisdictions that allow exculpatory clauses adopt them).
129. See In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 27 (discussing the duty of care claim). Plaintiff-appellees brought what was essentially a duty of care claim against the Walt Disney board of directors for approving the hiring and compensation package of Michael Ovitz. Both in the complaint and at appellant arguments, plaintiffs attempted an end-run around Section 102(b)(7) in several ways. Because neither the trial court nor the appellate court found gross negligence to rebut the business judgment rule, these arguments were moot. See id. at 46 n.37 (discussing the difficulties of bringing a duty of care claim). See also Hamermesh, supra note 123, at 479 ("Exculpatory charter provisions adopted pursuant to statutes, almost universally enacted since Van Gorkom, have rendered the damages claim for breach of the duty of care essentially non-existent. Cal. Feb. 9, 2012) (dismissing claim for "gross mismanagement" and "abuse of control," holding that these claims are merely a "repackaging" of claims for breach of the duty of care); In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 114 n.6 (Del. Ch. 2009) (explaining that it was treating the complaint's claim for "reckless and gross mismanagement" as a claim for a breach of fiduciary duty). faith. 134 Other duty of care claims were similarly unsuccessful.
In re
135
C. Excessive Risk, Compensation, and Waste
Another way to attempt to plead an essentially "grossly gross negligence" case is to allege waste. 136 The claim that an action of the board of directors constitutes waste is a claim that the board breached its duty of care to the corporation by taking an action with corporate assets that is not in the best interest of the corporation.
13 7 A showing that an excessive expenditure had no corresponding benefit to the corporation would constitute waste and rebut the business judgment rule. 138 Perhaps not surprisingly given the courts' deference to board decisions generally, courts rarely agree with shareholder claims of waste. 139 To succeed, a plaintiff would have to prove that the corporation received essentially no benefit from the expenditure.
14 0 In essence, a corporation would have to 134. See id. at *16 ("At most, the Plaintiffs' allegations suggest that there were other metrics not considered by the board that might have produced better results. The business judgment rule, however, only requires the board to reasonably inform itself, it does not require perfection or the consideration of every conceivable alternative."). 137. Though the duty of care is largely an inquiry into the rationality of the process behind board decisions, the claim of "waste" can be described as one that arises from an "irrational" decision, not a poorly judged decision. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levine, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (discussing the argument that a board's decision will not be disturbed if it can "be attributed to any rational business purpose"). The claim of waste can also be described as a vestige of the now anachronistic doctrine of ultra vires, which held that corporations could not take actions outside of their narrow corporate charters, including gifts and other wasteful acts. Now, corporations have broad corporate purposes to do any lawful acts, leaving the waste doctrine in a strange nether land. 
See in re
142
Though waste would not seem the most obvious claim against a corporation that suffered huge financial losses that were not the result of voluntary expenditures, some high-profile cases from the financial crisis made this argument either instead of or in addition to a duty of care claim. These cases built on a widespread concern over executive compensation, particularly compensation paid to actors at financial firms that both incurred losses and wreaked havoc on the U.S. economy. 143 These cases contend that the board of directors affirmatively created a compensation scheme for executives and others that resulted in large payouts to those who caused huge losses. 144 Therefore, the argument goes, the compensation schemes were wasteful. 145 Another route to the same result is to allege that the directors created a compensation scheme that incentivized traders to take high levels of risk. 146 Other cases involve large severance packages to 144. In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S'holder Litig., Civil Action No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *16 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) ("The Plaintiffs' waste allegations revolve around three premises: that Goldman's pay per employee is significantly higher than its peers, that Goldman's compensation ratios should be compared to hedge funds and other shareholder funds to reflect Goldman's increasing reliance on proprietary trading as opposed to traditional investment banking services, and that Goldman's earnings and related compensation are only the result of risk taking. 146. See In re Goldman Sachs, 2011 WL 4826104, at *19 ("The Plaintiffs specifically contend that the Director Defendants created a compensation structure that caused management's interests to diverge from the stockholders' interests. As a result, management took risks which eventually led to unethical behavior and illegal conduct that exposed Goldman to financial liability."). See also infra Part IV.B (discussing oversight fired leaders who steered the financial firms into ruin. 147 Generally, courts have not been receptive to these waste claims, 148 even in cases involving failed firms.
14 9 Courts in Delaware have routinely held that executive compensation is within the purview of the board of directors and not subject to claims questioning the judgment of the board in setting salary and bonus structures.1 50 However, in the Citigroup Delaware derivative litigation, 15 1 a waste claim was added to the main claim of failure to monitor excessive financial risk. 152 Plaintiffs had complained about the board of directors approving a letter agreement in late 2007 that gave outgoing CEO Charles 0. Prince $68 million and ongoing administrative support, including an assistant and a car and driver. 153 The plaintiffs argued that this payment, with seemingly little if any consideration, was to "a departing CEO whose failures as CEO were allegedly responsible, in part, for billions of dollars of losses at Citigroup."l 54 In dismissing the oversight claims, Vice Chancellor Laster did not dismiss the waste claim, holding that plaintiffs met the demand futility test and that "there [was] a reasonable doubt as to whether the letter agreement [met] the admittedly stringent 'so one sided' standard or whether the letter agreement awarded compensation that [was] beyond the 'outer limit' described by the Delaware Supreme Court." 1 55 However, this case was dismissed in 2012 without compensation to any plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney. 156 This voluntary dismissal seems to imply that the plaintiffs doubted whether the claim had any value at all, particularly given Citigroup's 102(b)(7) exculpation clause in its charter, which may have applied to a waste claim, 157 unless the claim was characterized as being in "bad faith." 
The Duty to Manage Risk
Other than this short-lived victory, compensation waste claims against firms that suffered in the financial crisis have not been successful.
IV. THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
A. The Duty of Oversight
The duty of loyalty historically has been applied to situations in which an agent has discretion as to how to employ a resource belonging to a principal and must be constrained not to employ that resource for the agent's own gain. In other words, the agent must not self-deal.1 59 In corporate law, the duty of loyalty is traditionally described as encompassing the duty of noncompetition, the duty of confidentiality, and the duty against self-dealing, including the duty not to usurp corporate opportunities.
0
In In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 16 1 the Delaware courts recognized a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against directors who fail to properly engage in oversight of firm employees who themselves engaged in problematic activities.1 62 Though the board of directors does not affirmatively vote on the behavior in question in such a case, the board is tasked with monitoring or supervising firm employees. The Caremark court explained that a successful oversight claim would adequately allege and prove that the board failed to put in place mechanisms to ferret out the specific bad behavior in the face of "red flags." 1 63 However, the board would not breach the duty if the board had no reason to know that problematic behavior could occur and that some sort of controls were necessary.
164 A breaching board is one that refuses to 162. Notably, this claim was recognized in Caremark, but the claim was unsuccessful. Though the firm became subject to substantial civil damages relating to alleged Medicare and Medicaid fraud perpetrated by its employees, the court held that the board satisfied its duty by having a monitoring system in place. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971-72. The court speculated that "only a sustained or systematic failure of a director to exercise reasonable oversight" would constitute a breach of duty. Id at 971.
163. See id. at 969 (interpreting Graham "as standing for the proposition that, absent grounds to suspect deception, neither corporate boards nor senior officers can be charged with wrongdoing simply for assuming the integrity of employees and the honesty of their dealings on the company's behalf").
164. See South v. Baker, 62 A.3d 1, 13-20 (Del. Ch. 2012) (dismissing an oversight complaint against a company with three serious mining accidents in a year because plaintiffs could not allege facts that the directors act in the face of a duty to act.
16 5 However, a failure to act cannot be inferred from a bad outcome or significant financial liability. 166 In addition, if the board has a mechanism in place, but the mechanism fails, this alone would not constitute a breach of the oversight duty.1 67 Though the Caremark court did not specify whether this "oversight" duty was part of the duty of care or the duty of loyalty, the Delaware Supreme Court eventually situated this duty into the duty of loyalty.1 68 Though this evolving interpretation may seem unexpected, this judicial turn saves the oversight cause of action from extinction. If oversight cases involved breaches of the duty of care, then these cases would disappear in the presence of 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses. 169 However, because oversight cases allege a breach of the duty of loyalty, which cannot be exculpated, parties will continue to bring these cases and have a chance of surviving a demand hearing in the derivative context. 170
B. Excessive Risk as a Breach of the Duty of Oversight
Because of both the business judgment rule and 102(b)(7) exculpation provisions, the most promising legal theory for the duty to manage risk is that it is part of the oversight duty. In other words, the duty to manage risk is really the duty to oversee those who are tasked with managing risk. This also makes sense given that few of the knew of the mining accidents; rejecting the argument that directors must have known). In dismissing the complaint as to the plaintiffs in front of him, but not all possible plaintiffs, Vice Chancellor Laster emphasized the importance of specific facts and not just presumptions arising from the existence of three accidents in one year:
Like any simplistic bright-line rule, a three-incidents-in-a-year test would be easy to administer. And concededly the number three has a lot going for it. Three Graces. Three Fates. Three wishes from the djinni in Aladdin's lamp. It's the number of licks it takes to get to the center of a Tootsie Pop, and for fans of Schoolhouse Rock, it will always be a magic number. But three mining accidents in a year does not support a reasonable inference of board involvement, much less bad faith, conscious wrongdoing, or knowing indifference on the part of a board of directors, particularly where the incidents appear unrelated. In a large corporation engaged in a dangerous business, three incidents could readily happen in a single year because of decisions made and actions taken sufficiently deep in the organization for the board not to have been involved.
Id. at 18.
165. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) ("Where directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation of good faith.").
166. See id. at 372 (explaining that oversight duty analysis does not, with the ability of hindsight, equate a bad outcome with bad faith).
167. See id. (explaining that a satisfactory oversight process may not guarantee that no employee will violate criminal laws or incur a substantial financial liability, or both).
168. Id 169. See Johnson, supra note 161, at 83-86 (discussing the uncertainty after Caremark as to whether an oversight claim was a duty of care claim subject to 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses, a new kind of duty of care claim not subject to 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses because it involves bad faith, or something else).
170. To prove that demand on the board of directors is futile, derivative plaintiffs must show that a majority of the board is not disinterested. If a director faces the possibility of liability, then the director is interested. If, however, the director faces no possibility of liability from the claim alleged because of an exculpation clause, then the director is disinterested. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 817 (Del. 1984).
financially devastating trading decisions, if any, were approved by boards of directors. 171 Therefore, most lawsuits that have attempted to hold directors liable for excessive risk taking by firm employees have situated this problem within the duty of oversight.1 72 Though directors and executive officers did not make any decisions about specific trades, investments, or sales of derivative products, the agents that they supervised did. Therefore, one could argue that these defendants created an environment in which excessive risk taking was encouraged and rewarded, without putting in place mechanisms to monitor firm-wide positions for excessive and undiversified risk. However, these plaintiffs have also met significant doctrinal hurdles. 173 Though the duty of oversight is not subject to the business judgment rule or exculpation clauses, it "is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment." 1 74 The initial set of hurdles is factual. First, the board of directors must not have any type of risk-management system in place,1 75 but must be on notice of the problem because of the existence of "red flags." 1 76 These facts are not easily alleged,' 77 particularly against a modem corporation with various levels of board and executive committees. Second, plaintiffs must convince the court that Caremark claims apply not only to a duty to monitor against wrongful misconduct, but also to a duty to monitor against poorly strategized conduct. Breaches of the duty of oversight have typically been associated with illegal conduct on the part of firm actors that subject a firm to government fines and penalties. 179 In fact, Caremark itself was a case in which employees of the firm were successfully investigated for fraud under federal programs such as Medicaid and Medicare. 180 Courts have been hesitant to extend Caremark claims from the criminal wrongdoing context to the mismanagement context. 18 1 Individual directors and officers would be liable to shareholders for their own decisions to engage in illegal misconduct. Therefore, turning a blind eye to the possibility of illegal misconduct in the face of red flags seems appropriately actionable by shareholders. However, given the business judgment rule, individual directors and officers are not liable to shareholders for their own negligent conduct. Accordingly, courts are extremely reluctant to create an oversight duty where no primary duty exists.
Again, plaintiffs won a victory against Countrywide Financial in the same consolidated cases that gave them a victory in the securities fraud context, though this victory would prove ephemeral. In the Central District of California, the federal district court denied a motion by various Countrywide defendants to dismiss shareholders' oversight claims in a derivative suit filed in the state where Countrywide was headquartered.1 82 Applying Delaware law, the court held that "red flags" existed because directors and officers knew that deviations from underwriting policies occurred in almost all loan originations and knew of the increase in mortgage delinquencies in the market. 183 In the Goldman case, plaintiffs attempted a slightly different approach than the unsuccessful Caremark claim in Citigroup. Among other things, plaintiffs alleged that the board failed to oversee actions that exacerbated business risk, but also that the board failed to supervise "unethical trading practices," including the so-called "Abacus" transaction.1 9 1 The court was not persuaded, stating that "'disloyal and unethical trading practices' are not sufficient pleadings of wrongdoing or illegality necessary to establish a Caremark claim."
19 2 Furthermore, even though the Abacus transaction resulted in a hefty civil settlement with the SEC, the court did not seem willing to find the "red flag" necessary for a breach of oversight duty from a "unique," "single transaction."
1 93 Though the court did not hold that a Caremark claim could never arise from business risk alone, the court did not leave much room for parties to plead such a claim, suggesting that claims centered on "[t]he manner in which a company 'evaluate[s] the trade-off between risk and return' would always be protected by the business judgment rule. 194 ViceChancellor Glasscock left open only the following situation:
The plaintiff would essentially have to show that the board consciously failed to implement any sort of risk monitoring system or, having implemented such a system, consciously disregarded red flags signaling that the company's employees were taking facially improper, and not just ex-post ill-advised or even bone-headed, business risks. Such bad-faith indifference would be formidably difficult to prove.
195
C. Excessive Risk Claims in the Southern District ofNew York
As part of an arguably growing trend, shareholders of Delaware corporations are bringing derivative cases against boards of directors in other jurisdictions. 196 Accordingly, shareholders attempted the same post-crisis claims in other jurisdictions, notably the Southern District of New York. Of course, other jurisdictions have to apply Delaware law to fiduciary duty claims against corporations incorporated in Delaware, but as happened in the Countrywide California litigation, some variations in applying Delaware law to the facts may occur. However, plaintiffs attempting to pioneer a riskoversight duty were not successful in the Southern District of New York, either.
197 At least regarding Delaware law, any duty to monitor risk is only theoretical, 198 if it exists at all.
199
D. The Theoretical Possibility of a Duty to Monitor Risk
Whatever glimmer of possibility remains for a successful oversight claim involving excessive business risks is vanishingly small. Oversight claims in general are extremely hard to plead; claims involving poor business decisions seem to be impossible to plead without much more. 200 Therefore, a claim of failure to monitor poor business decisions seems like the product of multiplying a very tiny fraction by an even smaller fraction, 198. See In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S'holder Litig., Civil Action No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *22 n.217 ("While a valid claim against a board of directors in a hierarchical corporation for failure to monitor risk undertaken by corporate employees is a theoretical possibility, it would .be, appropriately, a difficult cause of action on which to prevail.").
199. Of course, not all corporations are incorporated in Delaware and subject to Delaware law. Other states may not prove as hostile to these oversight claims. 200. Professors Hill and McDonnell do not seem to argue that courts should impose liability on the Citigroup and Goldman boards for the oversight duties at issue in the Delaware cases, but they do seem to wish for a more robust Caremark doctrine that would have allowed the claims to survive until trial, where other facts may have been revealed. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 22, at 876 (concluding that even when Delaware courts hold for defendants, they reinforce norms of proper board behavior, something that neither case did, perhaps because neither survived long enough). In addition, the authors wish that the Delaware courts, at the end of the presentation of all the evidence, could have given a "good ol' Delaware sermon" in the vein of Van Gorkom or Walt Disney, in which judges spill a lot of judicial ink telling current and future directors exactly how not to make decisions, whether or not liability is imposed. Ovitz was officially terminated without cause. Up to this point, however, the Disney board had never met in order to vote on, or even discuss, the termination at a full session, and few if any directors did an independent investigation of whether Ovitz could be terminated for cause. As a result, the Disney directors had been taken for a wild ride, and most of it was in the dark."). approaching zero.
20 1 As the duty of care cases make clear, courts will not second-guess corporate actors' business decisions. The policy reasons for this well-settled maxim of corporate law underlie the business judgment rule and are discussed in Part II. One of the two most compelling arguments is that judges are not well-suited by education, profession, or situation to second-guess decisions made at an earlier time after the result of that decision is apparent.
202 Thus, the business judgment rule attempts to insulate those decisions from an uninformed evaluator with hindsight bias. The other oft-stated reason for the business judgment rule is that diversified shareholders prefer their directors to be risk-seeking, not risk-averse.
203 Risk-seeking directors will prefer projects with higher rewards, potentially benefitting residual claimants with limited liability. If directors could be sued for the projects that failed, then shareholders would have two bites at every project apple. However, that design would leave directors choosing only low-risk or no-risk projects, creating little benefit for shareholders. In addition, others have argued that if more lawsuits were allowed for everyday business decisions, qualified directors would not expose themselves to personal liability by serving in the capacity of director, particularly that of outside director.
2 04 A similar argument has been made for having significant hurdles for Caremark oversight claims-qualified individuals will be more likely to serve as directors. 205 However, the decisions at the core of the failure to monitor risk claim are the very types of decisions that corporate law has wanted to keep insulated from shareholder complaints and judicial hindsight bias. Had boards of directors made these decisions, they would be protected by the business judgment rule and not subject to shareholder claims of a breach of the duty of care, unless the decisions were grossly negligent. Additionally, even if the decisions were grossly negligent, directors would not be subject to personal liability under an exculpation clause. In these financial crisis cases, the directors are charged with failing to monitor poor business decisions that corporate law has put out of the reach of shareholder lawsuits. At least under the existing framework of the duty to monitor, claiming an actionable oversight duty to monitor others' unactionable negligence seems illogical. 206
Oversight + Securities Fraud
Within the existing framework, one type of successful claim could look similar to the rare, but not quite mythological, successful oversight claim.
20 7 The easier type of claim would be one based on false statements relating to risk exposure. Securities fraud is unlawful and subjects the corporation to fines and shareholder liability; failure to monitor unlawful conduct is a traditional oversight claim.
20 8 This type of traditional oversight claim is difficult to plead; if the statements are made by individual officers and are not part of an SEC filing the directors approved, then the board of directors would have to see warning signs that the false statements were being made and do nothing to correct them. Even then, the false statements regarding risk exposure would have to be actionable under federal securities law, which has been difficult for plaintiff shareholders to prove regarding most qualitative statements about risk exposure.
Red Flags + Failure to Act
The second type of claim, the failure of oversight of financial risks without fraud or wrongful conduct 2 09 that Vice Chancellor Glasscock describes, 210 may approach the mythological. For this type of oversight claim, the board of directors must either have intentionally failed to put in place a risk monitoring system in the face of evidence that one was necessary or have a risk monitoring system but intentionally ignore any form of flashing lights or sirens that system produces.
2 11 A modem, publicly held corporation in the United States that faces any type of financial risk 2 12 will almost certainly have a monitoring system in place. 212. See Johnson, supra note 161, at 66 (describing the evolution of "enterprise-wide risk management" methods at financial institutions); but see Bainbridge, supra note 207, at 970-71 (citing a 2002 survey of corporate directors in which 43% of respondents "said that their boards had either an ineffective risk management process or no process for identifying and managing risk at all").
213. Two recent Delaware Court of Chancery decisions that denied motions to dismiss in oversight cases involved (non-financial firm) companies based in China that gained access to the U.S. capital markets through reverse mergers and did not appear to have working audit systems in place to guard against accounting and monitoring system would not be required, and a board would not be acting in bad faith by not implementing one. Once the board has put a system in place, the board would have to intentionally abandon it.
2 14 Hypothetically, a board might form a risk management committee that never meets 2 15 or put controls in place regarding limits on particular financial products in certain sectors that are routinely waived or ignored.
2 16 However, the decisions of such a committee regarding levels of risk would not create a cause of action against the board, as long as the process for setting limits and controls was rational.
2 17 In the 2008 financial crisis, many people across numerous firms with sophisticated players and internal structures made similar decisions.
2 18 Proving that each or any of those decisions was made in bad faith, the product of an irrational process or of no process would be nearly impossible.
V. A NEW DUTY?
Regardless of the unwillingness of Delaware law to recognize a duty to monitor risk within the existing duties of care and loyalty, other states may decide differently, either applying law from one of the other states to a corporation incorporated there or interpreting Delaware law differently. Legislatures 216. Another twist on the excessive compensation claim is the claim that directors breached their duty by approving compensation plans that had the effect of incentivizing excessive risk taking. These claims have also been dismissed as an effort to repackage unsuccessful oversight-of-risk-taking cases into (also unsuccessful) oversight-of-compensation cases. See Am. Int'l Grp., Inc. Deriv. Litig., 700 F. Supp. 218. See Langevoort, supra note 54, at 1222-23 (discussing two theories of the cause of the excessively risky trading decisions at the heart of the crisis: behavioral biases and moral hazard, but not irrationality).
219.
See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2010) (containing a fairly statutory description of director traditional ones. Delaware courts could change course. Or, as has been the case in recent years, the federal government could step in if regulators believe that state law is lacking in its regulation of corporate governance. 220 However, doctrinal and federalism issues aside, the creation of a mechanism for review of management activities in the area of risk management seems incredibly unwise on a number of axes.
A. Duty to Manage Risk Is Inconsistent with Fiduciary Duty Law
Not only does current state fiduciary law not allow for a duty to manage risk, but such a duty is also inconsistent with existing duties and limitations. In limiting the duty of care through the business judgment rule, courts and legislatures have expressed a disinterest in, and even an opposition to, judicial interference with internal business decisions. Expanding the reach of the duty of loyalty to encompass monitoring employees' decisions involving financial risk is inconsistent with the existence of the business judgment rule. To the extent that the investment community wishes for courts to a impose liability, at a minimum, for grossly negligent decisions regarding risk, exculpation clauses would need to be prohibited or required to be amended to allow for liability for gross management of business risk without a showing of bad faith or lack of a legitimate business purpose.
Fiduciary duties create boundaries around agents' discretion in situations that seem objectively against the principal's interest either because of the agent's bad motivations, self-interest, or purposeful neglect. Firm employees do not generally have interests adverse to the firm when they expose the firm to financial risk because of risky proprietary decisions. Employees took these decisions with the anticipation, whether well-reasoned or not, of profits for the firm.
B. Duty to Manage Risk Would Be Inherently Unmanageable
Assuming a duty to manage risk existed, courts would have to have some criteria for assessing whether that duty was met 22 1 other than the end results of various projects and enterprises. 222 Because courts have the benefit of hindsight, many decisions that seem defensible at one time period seem indefensible at a later time period. 223 No decision is risk-free, whether it involves purchasing assets, selling or purchasing derivatives, or acting as a market maker. No decision will result in profit 100% of the time, and various levels of profits will have various probabilities of occurring. 224 In addition, even if a project had a 95% chance of being profitable, 5% of the time it would not be, and shareholders would still bring failure to monitor claims. If the decision is judged under an objective, reasonable person standard, 2 2 5 then the duty to monitor becomes nothing more than the duty of due care.
Also, just as individuals have different appetites for risk, so do firms. If a firm's management is comfortable with high levels of risk taking, then there is nothing inherently incompetent, unethical, or illegal about that. Shareholders sort themselves into low-or high-risk firms or industries. Of course, problems arise when a firm or industry moves from being a low-risk firm to a higher-risk one, as firms such as commercial banks and mortgage lenders did leading up to 2008. Firms can move from being innovators to being static, but shareholders are in a better position to monitor their managers than courts after the fact. If excessive risk-taking harms anyone, it is the shareholder. If risk taking is firm-specific, then risk-taking discipline should be left to the market.
Some risky behavior, such as illegal behavior, has external consequences but internal rewards. Courts have recognized an oversight duty to ferret out illegal activity because firms might not have an incentive to do so; illegal activity might increase profits, not cause losses. However, firms should have ample incentive to monitor risk taking because poor risk management leads to immediate losses. The demonization of risk taking occurred during the financial crisis when a number of firms were creating systemic risk by being high-risk at the same time and in the same direction. However, these firms felt the losses in tandem with the market. 226 Additionally, a duty to monitor risk implies, rightly or wrongly, that there is an optimal amount of risk, at least for a specific firm. Perhaps this amount varies from firm to firm, time to time, or industry to industry, but at any moment there is a perfect amount of risk, or perhaps an acceptable band of risk.
227 If so, then shareholders should be able risk did not pan out and somebody lost money."). 223. One notable case in point is the Walt Disney litigation. The idea that a group of directors voted to approve a pay package that would pay a fired, and by all accounts lackluster, CEO $140 million for 14 months' work seems ridiculous. However, as the court pointed out, at the time the employment agreement with Michael Ovitz was negotiated and signed, Disney was attempting to recruit one of Hollywood's most successful agents, whose own business paid him over $20 million a year, and get him to try a new career in the middle of his life. To encourage Ovitz to take this risk, Disney created a compensation package designed to guarantee Ovitz the equivalent of five years' salary and bonus. However, the effect was that when Ovitz was fired so early in his contract, the per-month severance package seemed astronomical. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 51 (Del. 2006).
224. See Bainbridge, supra note 207, at 971 ("Evaluating such extremely low probability, but very high magnitude, risks is challenging because the outcomes associated with such risks do not follow a normal distribution.").
225. See Kaal & Painter, supra note 221, at 1450 (discussing the prudent person standard for monitoring risk).
226. This statement is not intended to overlook the fact that many financial firms have recaptured profits much sooner than homeowners who lost their homes or their jobs have recovered.
227. See Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas 0. Edwards, Risk Taking, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 159, 163 (" [A] ssuming that compensation-related regulations could be rightly calibrated to reduce risk-taking incentives, to bring an action not only for exceeding the acceptable band of risk, but also for not meeting it.
2 28 Perhaps during a particularly auspicious economic time, when many investments have high rates of return, an institution might opt for the least risky, least rewarding projects. If a duty to manage risk exists, then that duty should encompass taking relevant and appropriate risks as well. This hardly seems like a breach of duty, but logically it would have to be. If courts can determine how much risk is too much risk, then courts would also be able to determine how much risk is too little.
Finally, the financial crisis litigation focused on financial risks taken by primarily financial firms. However, a duty to monitor or manage risk would necessarily encompass other sorts of risks at all firms.
22 9 Firms might be liable for not being able to predict consumer tastes (leading to excessive business risk) 230 or being able to predict global events (leading to excessive political risk).
23 1 Firms might not be able to predict litigation risk arising from licenses or patents. The numerous everyday decisions that firms make may all be characterized as decisions made under uncertainty involving some type of risk.
232 Some theory of the duty to monitor financial risk from proprietary trading or market making would have to articulate why that kind of financial risk is either more worthy of or more capable of being enforced by shareholders through the court system. Otherwise, as the courts have warned, a duty to manage risk inevitably comes full circle, becoming like all other exercises of business judgment.
C. Duty to Manage Risk as a Disclosure Duty
Given adequate information, shareholders should be able to choose between firms that have significant amounts of financial risk, such as particular kinds of financial institutions not subject to additional layers of regulation that apply to commercial banks. Within a group of firms, shareholders should be able to choose between firms that are risk-seeking and firms that are more conservative. In a perfect world, shareholders should have been able to choose between investing in mortgage lenders that focused on we fail to see how regulators could set a fulcrum point for determining when risk taking becomes socially undesirable. Because the prevailing view seeks to address the question of financial stability via the reduction of excessive risk taking, 'excessive' should be defined.").
228. See Bainbridge, supra note 207 at 982-83 ("Just because a firm has the ability to reduce risk does not mean that it should . . .. All else equal, shareholders therefore prefer high return projects.").
229. But see Orenstein, supra note 22, at 789 (arguing for a Caremark duty to monitor risk in financial firms only because financial firm managers are incentivized to take on and allow excessive risk at their highly leveraged firms, unlike naturally risk-averse managers at nonfinancial firms).
230. subprime mortgage products and lenders that specialized in conforming mortgages with strict lending criteria. However, as we have seen with lawsuits involving Countrywide Financial and other firms, disclosures of business products and financial assets are not particularly clear for the average investor. 233 Moreover, if a shareholder invests in a very large enterprise, such as Citigroup or another bank holding company, sorting out the various types of financial risks in disclosure documents would be beyond most investors' time and attention.
One alternative to a new fiduciary duty would be to enhance the quality and readability of disclosures regarding financial risk.
2 34 The SEC could issue regulations that would mandate different kinds of disclosures, perhaps creating standard ways of presenting financial information.
23 5 However, as with any additional mandatory disclosure, 236 more information may not necessarily be helpful information. 237 For many firms, the information regarding financial risk was publicly disclosed, but the reader would have had to interpret the information as signaling large amounts of risk. 238 Or, courts could follow Countrywide and hold issuers liable for federal securities fraud for misleading qualitative statements such as "conservative" and "quality." This route would be more investor-friendly, but would also be over-inclusive and lead to many more securities fraud lawsuits.
VI. CONCLUSION
Shareholders, consumers, homeowners, borrowers, employees, and other citizens were harmed, in some cases substantially, by the business practices of individuals at various financial firms leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. After other financial crises, including the 2001 accounting fraud scandals, the public was treated to the catharsis of criminal prosecutions or even large civil judgments and settlements, but this rarely happened after the 2008 crisis. Instead, financial firms that incurred large losses on behalf of their shareholders repeatedly withstood those shareholders' attempts at legal redress. risks giving rise to the collapse of the market for securities backed by subprime mortgages were disclosed, yet the disclosure was insufficient, in part because complexity made the risks very difficult to understand.").
234. See Kaal & Painter, supra note 221, at 1473 (positing that allowing company managers to take risks, even firm-ending risks, with the benefit of the business judgment rule, may be preferable because a strict disclosure regime provides the incentive for directors to monitor and disclose risk).
235. See Robert Bartlett, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REv. 293, 295-96 (2012) (discussing proposals to increase disclosure of financial firms so market participants can make better investment decisions following the financial crisis).
236. The Dodd-Frank Act required the SEC to adopt rules mandating specific disclosures related to assetbacked securities, just one of many types of financial products; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.15Ga-1 (2011) (discussing repurchases and replacement relating to asset-backed securities Shareholders were turned away from the courthouse door in cases involving federal securities law claims and claims of breaches of state law fiduciary duties. Scholars and commentators have focused on one area of fiduciary duty that seemed to fit: a claim that the board of directors of a firm failed to exercise its oversight duty to monitor firm-wide financial risk. However, this claim was also unsuccessful in the courts as judges viewed the duty to monitor risk as repackaging the duty of care, which is significantly shielded from judicial review. Therefore, shareholders were left without a cause of action for admittedly "boneheaded" decisions of managers in light of changing economic circumstances.
This Article argues that the failure of the duty to monitor risk is not a bad development, but a logical and reasoned one. To say that shareholders, and by extension, courts, should not second-guess business decisions of boards of directors that are the result of a rational process, but to say that shareholders can second-guess the supervision of boards of those same decisions is inconsistent with decades of corporate governance jurisprudence. To make room for this duty within the duty of oversight or to create a separate duty to monitor financial risk would have the consequence of opening a side door to the questioning of all kinds of legal business decisions that have within them an element of business risk, political risk, currency risk, environmental risk, or legal risk. Though the oversight duty had been cabined to holding directors responsible for the crimes and wrongful acts they should have known were being perpetuated by firm employees, the duty to monitor risk would subject legal but risky actions to judicial scrutiny. This eventuality would, in effect, reduce the business judgment rule to a nullity.
Financial firms, particularly those firms that are not subject to banking regulation, will have a level of financial risk in their portfolios. Investors who choose to participate in this sector can sort themselves into firms with riskier or steadier focuses and endeavors. Of course, this type of market sorting is only possible with quality information in the market about the portfolios of these firms. Regulators' ability to improve the amount and readability of the information disclosed through additional mandatory disclosures, however, is a contestable point. Developing more consistent securities fraud jurisprudence surrounding qualitative statements by financial firms as to their conservative strategies, soundness, and high-quality portfolios may be more helpful to investors who focus on textual statements rather than lengthy quantitative disclosures. However, eroding existing doctrines of puffery in disclosure statements could subject issuers to liability for such statements as "we have a great line of products" when a particular product does not sell. Unfortunately, equity investing is risky, though the law attempts to decrease certain risks, such as the risk of fraud or self-dealing. Some risks, however, the law has chosen to let remain, such as the risks of mismanagement and management mistake. 239 Financial risk seems to fall within this category.
See
Kaal & Painter, supra note 221, at 1448 ("Risk taking can be intentional or unintentional. Examples of intentional and sometimes ill-informed risk taking include investments in risky real estate deals in the 1980s and the purchase of some CDOs and other mortgage-backed securities by investment banks and institutional investors prior to the 2008 credit crisis. Examples of unintentional risk taking include miscalculations in valuation models or algorithmic trading. While unintentional risk taking can impose additional costs on the institutions that incur it because of the added element of surprise, both intentional and unintentional risk taking can be costly, and sometimes more costly than the benefits derived there from.").
